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Abstract: Germany’s banking sector has been severely hit by the global 
financial crisis. In a German context as of February, 2009, this paper reviews 
briefly the structure of the banking industry, quantifies effects of the crisis on 
banks and surveys responses of economic policy. It is argued that policy 
design needs to enhance transparency and enforce the liability principle. In 
addition, economic policy should not eclipse principles of competition policy. 
Key words: bank, banking crisis, financial crisis, economic policy, Germany 
 
Inhalt: Der deutsche Bankensektor ist durch die internationale Finanzkrise 
schwer getroffen. Auf Deutschland und die im Februar 2009 verfügbaren 
Informationen bezogen, werden die Struktur des Bankensektors kurz 
umrissen, die Effekte auf die Banken quantifiziert und wirtschaftspolitische 
Reaktionen aufgezeigt. Ziel der Wirtschaftspolitik ist es, die Transparenz zu 
erhöhen und das Haftungsprinzip durchzusetzen. Darüber hinaus sollten 
Grundsätze der Wettbewerbspolitik nicht in den Hintergrund geraten. 
Schlagworte:  Bank, Bankenkrise, Finanzmarktkrise, Wirtschaftspolitik,  
    Deutschland 
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1. The German banking structure 
The German financial system is based on banks. Accordingly, these financial 
intermediaries play an important role in channelling funds from lenders to 
borrowers. This is highlighted by the amount of bank assets, which were double 
the GDP-figure in 2007 (IMF 2008), a very high ratio in an international 
perspective. Beyond its economic importance the German banking industry is 
characterised by the predominance of universal banks. These institutions 
engage in all fields of bank business activity. Universal banking in Germany is 
closely linked to the so called Hausbank approach. A Hausbank is the prime 
lender for companies, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises. Typically 
it has a long term relationship to the corporations and offers a wide range of 
services (Benston 1994: 121-31). Additionally, many commercial banks have 
traditionally been represented in the supervisory bodies of large corporations 
with a related corporate governance system that is based on insider control 
mechanisms. This so-called ´Deutschland AG´ was characterised by equity 
holdings of manufacturing enterprises by the financial intermediaries. By the 
same token banks and insurance companies were represented in the 
supervisory bodies of the enterprises. Following the trend of shareholder value 
management these equity stakes have been reduced substantially in the last 
decade (Kellermann 2005). So banks and insurance companies have 
concentrated on their core business. Accordingly, there are signs of 
convergence of the bank-based German financial system towards the market-
based Anglo-American model. These revisions bring up questions in the 
scientific community as to whether the elements of the German financial system 
are still coherent (Krahnen and Schmidt 2003). 
The universal banks are classified in three groups that differ by legal form and 
ownership structure. These form the so-called ‘three-pillar banking system’, a 
term often used to describe the German banking industry as a whole. The 
structure of those three pillars plus the specialised bank sector is highlighted in 
Table 1. 
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Number Assets (€ bn) Avg. assets / bank (€ bn)
First pillar: commercial banks 272 2,530,694 9,304
Big banks 5 1,520,699 304,140
Regional or other commercial banks 164 809,667 4,937
Branches of foreign banks 103 200,328 1,945
Second pillar: savings banks 448 2,682,317 5,987
Primary savings banks 438 1,619,614 3,698
Landesbanks 10 1,062,703 106,270
Third Pillar: cooperative banks 1,206 953,579 791
Primary cooperative institutions 1,204 290,725 241
Regional cooperative central banks 2 662,854 331,427
Specialised banks 62 1,926,638 31,075
Mortgage Banks 20 826,572 41,329
Building and loan associations 25 188,984 7,559
Banks with special functions 17 911,082 53,593
Total 1,988 8,093,228 4,071
Data source: Bundesbank (2008)  
Table 1: Structure of the German banking industry in 2008 
 
Commercial banks (´Kreditbanken´) are privately owned and have the principal 
intent to realize profits. Commercial banks only account for 14 per cent of the 
total number of banks, but own 31 per cent of the banking assets. These figures 
indicate that the best-known big German banks belong to this group. According 
to the statistical classification of the Bundesbank five banks form this sub-group 
of big banks: the Deutsche Bank, the Dresdner Bank, the Hypo-Vereinsbank, the 
Commerzbank and the Deutsche Postbank. These banks are active on a 
national and international level. The second sub-group of commercial banks 
comprises smaller institutions. Together with the branches of foreign banks as 
the third sub-group they offer various bank services on a national or regional 
level. Their market share is however far below the figure of the five big German 
commercial banks. 
The second pillar of the universal bank sector is the savings bank group 
consisting of the primary saving banks (Sparkassen) and their head institutions 
called Landesbanken. These intermediaries operate on a regional basis only 
and are owned by public law institutions such as cities, districts or federal states. 
Banks of this group have an autonomous legal status, yet their supervisory 
bodies (Verwaltungsrat) are manned with representatives of the respective 
public owner. According to the savings bank law the institutions are obliged to 
serve the public interest of their region. This is to foster savings and economic 
development in a regional perspective. However, even if an explicit profit target 
is not the first priority of the savings banks, it has become the factual objective of 
banking operations.  
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Public guarantees that exist for the saving banks due to the public ownership 
have been discussed intensively. In fact the public entities are liable without 
restriction in the event of a default. This guarantee has two facets. Firstly, there 
is a maintenance obligation (Anstaltslast) as a commitment to equip the 
institution under public law with the necessary means to fulfil its public mission. 
Secondly, a bail-out obligation (Gewährträgerhaftung) exists. This is an unlimited 
responsibility of the public owner for the liabilities of its public law institutions. 
This bail-out obligation is only relevant in case of a liquidation of a savings bank, 
as the maintenance obligation applies as a first line of defence in case of 
financial distress. As these two guarantees back the savings banks completely, 
a solvency risk is virtually non-existent with ensuing lower refinancing costs. This 
results in a clear distortion of competition. The European Commission assessed 
the guarantees as the equivalent of subsidies and initiated two agreements in 
2001 and 2002 with Germany to abolish both Anstaltslast and Gewährträger-
haftung by 2005. However, liabilities incurred before July 2005 and maturing 
before 2016, in addition to all liabilities incurred before July 2001, will be 
grandfathered. Accordingly, the savings bank group is currently in a state of 
transformation to adapt to competitive conditions. Yet the savings bank group is 
still immune to takeovers and thus protected from other forms of competitive 
pressure. Savings banks are not for sale. A takeover by a commercial bank 
would imply losing the aspect to serve the public interest as defined by saving 
banks laws. The regional principle also impedes competition between saving 
banks, as each institution is prohibited from operating outside its local area. So 
competition in rural areas is typically with cooperative banks and in municipal 
cities with commercial banks (Siebert, 2004: 12-15).  
The primary saving banks only operate on a local level. They may typically not 
hold shares outside the savings bank group, trade money market, equity and 
foreign exchange instruments on their own account or take part in an 
underwriting consortium. These fields of business are covered by the 
Landesbanks that are mainly active on the regional level. Yet, following their 
investment banking activities these institutions have become increasingly 
involved in international business including some foreign subsidiaries. In addition 
to those commercial and investment banking activities the Landesbanks serve 
as a Hausbank to their federal states. As such they provide cash management 
services and grant loans, which are mainly refinanced by bonds. Further they act 
as a central clearing institution for the interbank transfers of primary savings 
banks. Together the Landesbanks and primary saving banks offer a truly 
universal banking service. The Landesbanks are currently in a process of 
consolidation. The Landesbank of Rheinland-Pfalz merged with the Landesbank 
Baden-Würtemberg (LBBW). In 2008 the LBBW also took over the state bank of 
Saxony, the SachsenLB. 
The third pillar of the universal bank sector is the credit cooperatives sector 
(Genossenschaftsbanken). Credit cooperatives are typically owned by their 
clients and profits are distributed as dividends to the members owning the 
cooperative. The number of credit cooperative members is currently close to 
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sixteen million. Usually a broad ownership is required by the statutes and shares 
cannot be sold. For raiders it is almost impossible to gain control over 
cooperative banks, as each member only has one vote irrespective of the value 
of his share. Thus, the cooperatives are not subject to the market of corporate 
control (Siebert 2004: 17). 
The cooperative sector shares many features of the savings banks group. 
Primary cooperative institutions operate according to the regional principle. As 
such they mainly provide retail banking services to their customers. Since 1974 
loans can also be granted to non-members. The role of the two central 
institutions of the credit cooperative group (DZ-Bank and WGZ-Bank) is 
comparable to the Landesbanks of the savings bank group. They provide cash 
management services, enable deposits and credits within the credit cooperative 
group and offer additional commercial and investment banking services 
(Hackethal, 2003: 83-5).  
The institutions of the three pillars differ significantly regarding their business 
models. The commercial banks have a relatively high share of international 
financing, whereas the primary savings banks and cooperatives are financed 
domestically, mainly by deposits of the non-financial sector. Thus, the primary 
savings banks will not suffer significantly from the abolishment of state 
guarantees. This is quite different for the Landesbanks that source one-third of 
their financing from bonds. Interest rates for these bonds have been traditionally 
25 to 40 basis points below market level, an advantage that will phase out 
(Brunner et al. 2004: 24-5). Assets also mirror the differing business models of 
the universal banking group. Commercial banks as well as the head institutions 
of the savings banks show a high degree of internationalisation. The 
international links are particularly high for the big five commercial banks, with the 
Deutsche Bank being the only German bank in a top 20 ranking of the world’s 
biggest banks by assets (Bankersalmanac, 2009). In contrast, granting loans to 
domestic individuals and companies is the major business of primary savings 
banks and cooperatives. The Landesbanks have the highest market share for 
credits to companies, followed by the big five commercial banks and the primary 
savings banks (Bofinger et al. 2008a: 91). 
Besides the three-pillar universal banking structure there are some specialised 
banks in Germany. This group is extremely heterogeneous. The mortgage banks 
provide loans that are backed by liens on moveable or immoveable assets. 
Loans are refinanced by special bonds, the Pfandbriefe. Building and loan 
associations (Bausparkassen) finance themselves by deposits of their 
customers and provide loans for house building. The banks with special 
functions as the third sub-group grant loans to persons and institutions that are 
considered to be eligible for special funding. The state defines this funding 
eligibility with public targets like the promotion of small and medium-sized 
enterprises, reconstruction and development or support of foreign trade. The 
most important bank with special functions is the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 
(KfW). It is also active in the financing of projects of development policy, partly 
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via its fully-owned subsidiary DEG (Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungs-
gesellschaft).  
As Table 1 shows, Germany stands out by the importance of the public savings 
banks and the credit cooperatives. These two groups account for approximately 
one third of the market each if measured by the value of assets. While the legal 
forms of these two banking groups allow for mergers within the groups, mergers 
and acquisitions with commercial banks are not feasible. Two-thirds of the entire 
market is thus not subject to the market of corporate control. Despite the high 
fragmentation of the German banking market there are barriers to inter-group 
competition. Competition intensity is also limited due to the regional principle of 
these two banking groups. Owing to this segmentation the number of banks 
overstates the degree of competition (Brunner et al. 2004: 6-23). This is 
supplemented by the fact that the reported profits are not of prime importance 
for the public sector banks. Yet, market conditions still impede foreign banks to 
enter the German market to a large extent. This is even more striking, as there 
no special hurdles to enter the market. Competitors from EU-countries actually 
have a ‘free passport’ to enter the country following the agreed principles of the 
second banking directive in 1989. Though the market share of foreign banks 
nearly doubled in the last decade to a value of roughly eleven per cent if 
measured by assets, this value is among the lowest for EU countries (vgl. 
Bofinger et al. 2008a: 86-7).  
In spite of the special structural characteristics of the German banking market, 
there have been considerable market developments. The number of institutions 
has been reduced by roughly 27 per cent from the year 2000 to 2008. This 
concentration process increased the average assets per institution by 33 per 
cent. The concentration predominantly took place in the cooperative sector, 
which reduced its number of institutions from 2,039 in the year 2000 to the 
number of 1,206 in 2008. In the same period the number of savings banks was 
reduced by mergers from 580 to 448, whereas the number of commercial banks 
remained nearly constant. So consolidation occurred within and not across the 
pillars.  
However, the restructuring which took place within the banking groups failed to 
deliver the intended increase in results. As Table 2 shows, the average return on 
equity was declining in every sub-group of the German banking system between 
1994 and 2006. This decline in profitability is a distinctive development for the 
German banking industry in international comparison. Equivalent results apply 
for the return on assets. There appears to be no evidence that the cost situation 
of German banks is causing the shortfall in profitability. By contrast, low earnings 
appear to be associated with relatively low revenue generation (Brunner et al. 
2004: 19-21). These findings support the view of a relatively intense competition 
on the German banking market. Yet, a reluctance to adopt new business models 
is another factor that is potentially impacting the revenue side. There is ongoing 
research to access these impacts empirically (Bofinger et al. 2008a: 101-11). A 
striking fact is to be observed regarding the profitability by banking sub-group. 
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Big commercial banks, Landesbanks and the cooperative central banks show a 
distinctly lower return of equity compared to other to other sub-groups. 
Accordingly, the profitability gap is concentrated on large financial intermediaries 
with their high assets per bank figures, as shown in Table 1. These figures 
suggest that the respective banks have surely reached the size that offers the 
opportunity to realize large scale economies, as being estimated in prior 
research (for an overview refer to Bos and Kolari 2005: 1555-61). This argument 
once again supports the view that unfavourable cost positions that result from 
market fragmentation are not the cause for low profitability. To sum up: in spite 
of the structural particularities of the German banking market, which cushions 
some competitive mechanisms, there appears to be a sufficient degree of 
competition. 
 
1994-1999 2000-2006
First pillar: commercial banks
Big banks 14.6% 5.3%
Regional and other commercial banks 12.6% 7.2%
Second pillar: Savings banks
Primary saving banks 19.3% 10.1%
Landesbanks 9.8% 4.3%
Third pillar: credit cooperatives
Primary cooperative institutions 15.5% 10.2%
Regional cooperative central banks 14.9% 5.0%
Data source: Bofinger et al. (2008a)  
 
Table 2: Return on equity of German banks 
 
2. Causes of the financial crisis 
Global financial markets have faced disruptions since the year 2007. As the 
financial turmoil had harsh consequences for Germany and its financial market 
policy, it makes sense to review the development of the crisis briefly. In current 
economic commentaries there is a surprising consensus about the major 
mechanisms that wreaked havoc on the global financial system.1 Today, there is 
a clear agreement that a hype in the housing markets of the United States was 
the root of the crisis. Originally, the boom of real estate markets was induced by 
the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve Bank resulting in low interest rates 
(Bofinger et al 2008b: 119-121). Thus, cheap money was available resulting in a 
                                                          
1 Unfortunately for the economic profession, this is a mere retrospective consensus. 
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high real estate demand. Accordingly, real estate prices rose constantly. This 
motivated high levels of borrowing, because individuals anticipated further price 
increases. 
This speculative occurrence was bolstered by financial intermediaries. Credit to 
house owners was granted generously. Fair value accounting of banks also 
anticipated increasing real estate prices – a procedure that justified elevated 
credit approvals. In consequence, typical credit checks or ceilings were 
undermined. As credit approval procedures lacked prudence, substantial high-
risk lending in subprime segments was the result. Such procedures have been 
fostered by the new ‘originate-to-distribute’ business model. Whereas banks 
traditionally had loans on their balance sheets (originate-to-hold), the new 
approach was to sell the generated loans to outsiders transferring the risks 
simultaneously. This was enabled by means of structured finance or more 
precisely: the securisation. Housing loans were polled in portfolios and sold as 
securities of several tranches on the financial market. In the bottom line long-
term loans have been refinanced with short-term securities.  
In this way the famous ‘asset backed securities’ (‘ABSs’) of today emerged, with 
the assets behind being the claims for the blend of the original mortgages. With 
this business model a formidable expansion of housing loans was possible 
(Blundell-Wignell et al 2008: 3-8). By selling the portfolios the underlying loans 
were removed from the balance sheets of the originators. One implication was 
that the transfer of loans to third parties hampered the incentive for a cautious 
risk evaluation of borrowers. This furthered lending activity in subprime 
segments. As a second effect of securisation the equity requirements for granted 
loans, as defined in the Basel accords, were circumvented. Originating banks 
achieved the off-balance sheet situation even for unsold parts of the loan 
portfolios by transferring assets to the special purpose vehicles (‘SPVs’). So the 
available equity of banks was no limit for risky lending activities any more 
resulting in a high leverage of financial intermediaries. Furthermore, low interest 
rates as a result of monetary policy induced high leverage ratios of banks 
(Wehinger 2008: 2-6). These financial structures of banks increased return on 
equity and shareholder value in times of favourable business climate, yet to the 
burden of negative leverage effects in the case of an unfavourable business 
environment. 
Selling the asset backed securities to other financial intermediaries was only 
possible due to the apparent low-risk characteristic profile of the structured 
products. Risk reduction was on the one hand accomplished through 
diversification of the portfolio and on the other hand through financial 
engineering. Here, the concept of tranching is of prime importance. A key goal of 
this process is to create assets with higher ratings than the average rating of the 
underlying assets. This is achieved by prioritisation of payments to so-called 
senior notes, followed by junior or mezzanine notes and finally the equity notes. 
Accordingly, losses of the portfolio are born by the different tranches in the 
opposite direction. The different tranches are the so-called collateralized debt 
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obligations (CDOs), which cascading interest rates from senior to equity notes. 
The distilled senior tranches with excellent risk ratings accounted for up to 90 
per cent of the portfolio with this figure illustrating the extent of apparent risk 
reduction. This judgment was delivered by credit rating agencies based on 
statistical methods such as the value-at-risk. The latter estimates a maximum 
loss of a portfolio at a given time horizon with a defined probability. To calculate 
this risk historical data are used.  Yet, the relevant subprime loan default data 
were only available over a short period, which moreover was a period without 
adverse effects. With the excellent risk ratings the respective asset backed 
securities spread out in the financial systems, both domestically in the United 
States and internationally. The misjudged risk evaluation once again resulted in 
the absence of a sound risk provision by equity of financial intermediaries. 
Against the background of this inadequate risk management, the financial 
system bore an inherent instability at the onset of the crisis. With several 
subsequent increases of the federal funds rate, mortgage rates experienced a 
similar upwards trend. This caused a higher debt service for households. Loan 
defaults swelled correspondingly in 2007 and the housing bubble burst. 
Increasing default rates required a re-evaluation of the asset-backed securities. 
The consequent write-offs caused losses of financial intermediaries, particularly 
in the United States and Europe. In Germany this first wave of the financial crisis 
affected especially the Industriebank AG and several Landesbanks such as the 
SachsenLB. Due to the sharp decline of demand for asset backed securities the 
originators came under pressure. The revolving short-term refinancing was 
disturbed and credit lines at the originating banks were used to bridge the gap. 
Stressed liquidity of some financial intermediaries was the result. 
As a reflection of a changed risk perception and because of doubts about the 
solvency of banks, interbank markets came under pressure. The trigger point for 
this second wave of the financial crisis was the collapse of the American 
investment bank Lehman Brothers in August 2008, when not only equity holders 
but for the first time also borrowers experienced losses in the course of the 
crisis. Damaged trust in interbank business disrupted money markets (Fender 
and Gyntelberg 2008: 4-13). Interbank rates rose to levels well above the returns 
on bank assets. Chiefly banks with mismatching maturities of assets and 
liabilities such as the German Hypo Real Estate Group ran into liquidity 
problems. At the same time doubts were raised about the soundness of other 
US assets of financial intermediaries, such as credit card debt, corporate loans 
and derivative products. The melange of these bad positions is often referred to 
as ‘toxic assets’. In several steps banks announced write-downs which 
amounted worldwide to a total of 518 € bn. by the end of the year 2008. The 
losses are concentrated in Europe and North America, as shown in Figure 1. 
Yet, it is certainly advisable to be extremely cautious with the interpretation of 
any data due to both the dynamics of the crisis and the piecemeal approach of 
banks to announce write-downs.  
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Figure 1: Bank write-downs by region (€ bn; 11/09) 
 
With the foregoing financial crisis effects on the real economy ensued. As the 
write-downs reduced the equity of banks the scope of lending has been reduced. 
This causes worse loan conditions for the private as well as the corporate sector 
and reduces aggregate demand. Investment activities of the corporate sector 
are further hampered by increasing interest rates, which result from the credit 
crunch in the interbank markets despite of expansionary monetary policy of 
central banks worldwide. Furthermore, the present situation in early 2009 is 
characterised by a loss in confidence of economic subjects resulting in a deep 
recession.  
 
3. Effects in Germany and policy responses 
As already shown, the financial crisis had substantial effects on Germany 
despite its distinct financial market setting. Related to this the German situation 
rather results from international contagion than from domestic developments. 
Prices on real estate markets have been stable in Germany (Kholodilin et al. 
2008), so that there is no parallel to the origin of the crisis in the United States. 
Additionally, financing in the housing sector is still conservative: mortgages are 
typically fixed rate annuity loans and have a typical credit ceiling of 60 per cent 
of the purchasing price. With this environment the situation in Germany is less 
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complex as opposed to other countries, which had a housing boom prior to the 
crisis. As the crisis was transmitted internationally to Germany, the fragmented 
banking structure of Germany had unexpected positive effects. A low 
concentration of the banking industry resulted at first in diversification effects of 
the banking industry as a whole. Large parts of the banking system such as the 
primary saving banks and the credit cooperatives remain unaffected by write-
offs. Only international players such as the big private banks, the Landesbanks 
and some special banks were victims of the first wave of financial crisis.  
First instances of major write-downs are linked to two banks. In August 2008 the 
SachsenLB reported first losses owing to a subsidiary that was active in 
refinancing asset-backed securities. After an emergency rescue package to 
ensure liquidity, the SachsenLB was taken over by another Landesbank, the 
LBBW. Likewise the majoritarian private Deutsche Industriebank AG ran into 
liquidity problems as it was unable to refinance its special purpose vehicles via 
short-term commercial papers. By an increase in capital stock the Kreditanstalt 
für Wiederaufbau (KfW) augmented its share from 40 to 91 per cent and sold its 
share to the financial investor Lone Star a year later. In this early period 
economic policy was based on a case by case approach aiming to prevent a 
breakdown of the affected banks. 
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Figure 2: Write-downs and losses of German banks (12/09) 
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With the spreading crisis other banks also experienced losses. As Figure 2 
shows, the BayernLB was heading the list of write-downs by bank at end of 
2008. The figures presented are, however, prior to any news that may come out 
as soon as annual reports for 2008 are published. Given this preliminary basis 
the realised write-downs of the savings banks group are disproportionate to their 
share of assets of the total banking industry. Corresponding data by pillar of the 
banking system are shown in Figure 3. Write-downs of the saving banks group 
only result from the Landesbanks with their international operations. This 
indicates that high risk taking and governance problems were present at least in 
some of the Landesbanks. The financial crisis fostered the reorganisation of the 
Landesbanks with the LBBW taking over two partner institutions. Similar 
discussions are currently taking place for another Landesbank, the WestLB of 
North Rhine-Westphalia. This bank has been subject to public discussion since 
2003 due to its risky investment banking activities followed by losses in 2006 
due to proprietary trading. 
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Figure 3: Distribution of assets and write-downs by banking group 
 
However, in the course of the year 2008 things began to move fast with 
subsequent announcements of banks’ write-downs. The private banks did not 
make an exception to this process. Since autumn 2007, when first write-downs 
were revealed, quarterly results included ever mounting figures for losses 
following the subprime crisis’ spread to more and more types of assets. The 
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Deutsche Bank experienced the highest losses of all commercial banks, which 
results from its size and internationalisation. The write-downs of Dresdner Bank 
and Commerzbank were substantially lower, also if compared to their lower 
assets. The private bank being most threatened by insolvency in 2008 is the 
Hypo Real Estate that belongs to the group of specialised banks. Apart from 
write-downs of 4 € billion the bank ran into refinancing problems with its 
subsidiary Depfa, an intermediary active in government financing. At first the 
possible default of the Hypo Real Estate was politically handled as another 
special case. Guarantees of 50 € billion were granted in early October 2008. 
These events show that all types of German banks are affected by the financial 
crisis. The assets written down by end of December were split into a 51 per cent 
share of private banks of the first pillar and the special bank group, 9 percent of 
the cooperative bank group and 40 percent of public banks. Because public 
banks account for 42 per cent of the total bank assets in Germany, present data 
do not support the opinion that excessive risk taking has been limited to the 
public sector. Governance problems existed apparently irrespective of 
ownership structures. 
The repeated emergency support actions for banks and the mounting pressure 
on money markets gave rise to a more systematic framework for bank support, 
the financial market stabilisation act (Finanzmarktstabilisierunggesetz or short: 
FMStG). Whereas the legislation in Germany normally is a semi-fluid process 
due to federal structures, the act was approved with astonishing speed on 
October 17th, 2008 after a tight week of consultation. The main objective of the 
FMStG is to stabilise money markets and banks accordingly, the so-called 
Rettungsschirm (emergency parachute) for banks. With an overall volume of 480 
€ billion this rescue pack is of larger scale in the international perspective when 
compared to the realised write-downs and losses of the financial sector, as 
shown in Table 3. With 400 € billion by far the larger part of the rescue pack is 
designated for guarantees of bonds and loans of banks. The remaining 80 € 
billion are for purposes of recapitalisation as well as purchases of non-
performing assets for a term of three years. 
 
Capital 
injection
Asset 
purchases/ 
swaps
Guarantees/ 
loans / credit 
lines
Total Bank write-downs
Rescue pack 
as % of write-
downs
Germany 80 0 400 480 57 12%
Other Euro Area 121 98 1,283 1,502 33 2%
Other Europe 68 42 497 607 101 17%
USA 683 1,318 1,559 3,560 308 9%
Total 952 1,458 3,739 6,149 499 8%
Data source: ECB (2008); US-$ values for write-downs converted at 1.37 US-$/€
Remark: the 80 € bn for both asset purchases and capital injection in Germany are assigned to capital injection for 
              the sake of simplicity.  
 
Table 3: Comparative view of financial rescue packages 
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The financial rescue fund (Sonderfonds Finanzmarktstabilisierung or short: 
SoFFin) is administrated by the Finanzmarktstabilisierungsanstalt (FMSA), a 
public institution especially setup for this purpose. By February 2009 a total 
amount of 117 € billion of guarantees has been granted to banks. For an 
overview by bank refer to Figure 4. The Hypo Real Estate with its ongoing 
solvency problems accounts by far for the largest share. Rumours about a 
planned nationalisation of this bank do not cease. The option of asset purchases 
was not used; apparently due to the fixed term schedule which would 
necessitate to record contingent liabilities on banks’ accounts and thus impede 
the disburdening balance-sheet effect. The first capital injection was made at the 
Commerzbank in order to stabilize its situation after taking over the Dresdner 
Bank from Allianz in January 2009. A 25 per cent share of the Commerzbank 
now belongs to the German state, representing a blocking minority for any 
decision subject to approval of the shareholders’ meeting. A different kind of 
government support was taken up by the Deutsche Bank in the course of the 
Postbank takeover. Following a renegotiation of 22.9 per cent acquisition of the 
Postbank shares, the Deutsche Bank achieved payment via an exchange of 
stocks. Accordingly, the parent of Postbank, the Deutsche Post AG, still state-
owned by 30 per cent, now owns up to 8 per cent of the largest German 
commercial bank, officially a short-lived construction. So there is indirect state 
support for the external growth of Deutsche Bank as well, whereas the bank is 
currently insisting on not resorting to the rescue pack of SoFFin. 
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Figure 4: SoFFin disbursements (€ bn) as of February 2009 
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By mid of February 2009 there are applications pending for SoFFin support from 
the Landesbanks of Bavaria, Baden-Wurttemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and 
Hamburg / Schleswig-Holstein. The Volkswagenbank, a commercial bank 
subsidiary of the Volkswagen Group, also filed an application. In spite of these 
procedures the interbank markets are not yet recovering. The reluctance of 
banks to engage in money market transactions with each other goes along with 
ever increasing estimates about the amount of toxic assets owned by German 
banks. The latest forecasts estimate a total of 97 € billion of bad assets are still 
in the balance sheets of German banks. Further discussions on how to shore up 
financial markets are underway. A bad bank aimed at taking over non-
performing assets was heavily discussed in January 2009, but finally rejected by 
political decision makers (FAZ 30.01.2009). With the deep recession clouding 
the business climate, even further political interferences into the capital markets 
appear most likely. 
 
4. Aims of a future financial market policy 
Deriving adequate future market policies requires a prior diagnosis of the 
recently misguided development of financial markets. The major symptom is a 
misallocation of financial resources, as revealed by the current wave of write-
downs. To put it clearly: as the risk of failure is intrinsically tied to 
entrepreneurship it is not the event of non-performing bank assets that is of 
relevance, but the extent of this occurrence. The latter signifies that financial 
intermediaries have failed to perform in their core competency, which normally is 
a superior evaluation of risks. The misevaluated risks have been produced in the 
financial market of the United States with their exorbitant foreign debt (El-Shagi 
2008: 19). Deficient financial market regulation in the United States and 
international regulatory arbitrage towards the US market has prepared the 
ground for the crisis (Winkler 2008: 2-4). Here, the innovations of financial 
intermediaries turned out to be destructive for the market system instead of the 
productive effect entrepreneurship should have (Baumol 1990: 893-921). Such 
misguided entrepreneurship of banks results from deficient incentive structures. 
The latter existed in spite of speed and scope of financial market reforms in the 
last decades. Thus, reforms lacked the right focus or direction in industrial 
countries. In the following it is argued that insufficient liability and transparency 
as well as undesirable concentration of financial intermediaries are the core 
challenges. 
A deficient liability scheme for the bank management is the first core problem 
(Broll et al. 2008: 1350-51). Lacking liability results in higher risk-taking, as 
gambling is a profitable individual strategy in case losses are bailed out by third 
parties. Yet, this practice does not comply with the social risk preference. 
Deficient liability can be detected in management remuneration that is sharing 
profits but no losses. Even in case of bank management failures there is hardly 
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a sanction, but rather a ‘golden handshake’. Corporate governance mechanisms 
are thus not working efficiently yet (Rehm 2008: 307); this problem obviously 
exists both in market-based and bank-based financial systems. A more intense 
acceptance of risk by the top management itself is an aim of new corporate 
governance schemes. Another detriment to the principle of liability is a lack of 
sufficient bank equity to cover the taken risks. In general, high equity ratios will 
work as a buffer to adverse developments. Related to this, equity requirements 
of the Basel accord need to be adjusted, in order to increase banks’ equity even 
in a boom. Currently, low default probabilities of bank assets in these periods 
result in low equity requirements. This is reversed in a recession, with the higher 
bank equity required resulting in lower bank lending and thus a pro-cyclical 
effect (Bofinger et al. 2008b: 170-1). Finally, unrealistic return on equity targets – 
as for example the 25 per cent put forward by the Deutsche Bank until 2007 – 
need to be revised. Achieving such profitability targets is in the long term only 
possible through competitive advantage for banks. Rather, high return on equity 
targets are often realised by high leverage; a risky and undesirable situation as 
the financial crisis showed (Hartmann-Wendels 2008: 708). 
An increase in transparency is a second reform target. Transparency enables 
the functioning of the price mechanism, which is in the bottom line processing 
information (Hayek 1945: 519-30). Information can only be processed, if it is 
available to economic agents. Thus, transparency is a crucial factor. A multi-step 
securisation process is evidently not enhancing transparency. As explained, 
banks are currently struggling with the appraisal of their assets. If even banks – 
the best informed economic agents on the financial markets – face these 
problems, products appear to be too complex. A certain standardisation might 
be of advantage (Wehinger 2008: 29). Further, risk measures used by financial 
intermediaries are apparently deficient, as they did not incorporate the 
behavioural risks that are relevant to financial markets like herding effects (Broll 
et al 2008: 1350-1). Likewise, liquidity risks have been underestimated, as the 
refinancing problems of banks show. A proper functioning of rating agencies is 
also necessary for transparency, particularly for structured financial products. A 
part of the related problems are certainly associated to the methods and 
procedures used so far. A more fundamental reform is to unbundle consulting 
and rating activities because of the incorporated conflict of interests. Another 
issue is to tie the remuneration of rating agencies to the accuracy of their 
forecasts. By doing so, a short-termism of rating agencies can be prevented. 
This appears necessary, because the rational long-term target of a rating 
agency to build up reputation by adequate ratings has obviously become 
subordinate recently. 
This brings us to the third reform challenge: reducing concentration. As a 
starting point one should keep in mind that financial markets will never be stable. 
They should even be the contrary: (financial) innovations always inherently have 
the risk of failure. This is an integrated part of the concept of a dynamic 
development in a competitive market process. Banks with non-viable concepts 
adapt or exit the market. If the latter raises a problem to the financial markets as 
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a whole, banks become ‘Too-Big-to-Fail’ (Brewer and Jagtiani 2007). This is 
exactly the way the second wave of the global financial crisis arose. The 
collapse of Lehmann Brothers aggravated the crisis strongly, because the bank 
was ‘relevant to the system’ (Bofinger et al. 2008b: 122-3). If one single bank is 
relevant to the world financial markets, a lack of competition is evident. Here, a 
lower concentration would have resulted in diversification and stabilisation of the 
financial market. Unfortunately, corresponding views are currently not en vogue. 
Concentration in the banking industry is increasing in Europe and the United 
States (Schildbach: 2008: 2), a coincidence with the regions most affected by 
the financial crisis. In Germany, the financial crisis spurs on the concentration 
process, as the mentioned mergers of private and public banks show. These 
procedures are already questionable from a corporate point of view, because 
most Landesbanks and all big commercial banks already have a considerable 
size. Empirical studies do not prove that additional large scale economies can 
be realized by further growth of these banks (Bos and Kolari 2005). Additionally, 
gaining in size is apparently confused with socially desirable business models. 
Large banks already have substantial threats to the state (Funk 2009: 76) and 
there is hardly any reason to worsen this situation even more. Especially in 
financial markets economies of size have the striking opportunity cost of banks’ 
attempts to gamble for state intervention in case banks’ business policies fail.  
Apart from these principles for future financial market reforms, the current 
rescue efforts for banks require further attention. Despite the extent and the 
speed of state support, interbank markets are not functioning yet. This is 
illustrated by the differences of insured to uninsured money market rates as 
shown in Figure 5. Whereas the European rescue packages achieved bringing 
the rampant spread in the third quarter of 2007 down to a level in line with the 
figures of the period from mid-2007 to mid-2008, it is still far above the long-term 
average. This is not due to missing liquidity, as the deposit facilities at the 
central bank are increasing sharply. Yet, distrust is still present among banks 
hampering interbank lending. It is to be feared that banks as insiders to the 
market have the best forecasts on outstanding write-downs. So a substantial 
part of the necessary support for banks may be ahead. 
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Figure 5: Spread Euribor to Eurepo 3-month in basis points 
 
When analysing a financial rescue package, it is obvious that special short-term 
targets are relevant. Whether these are achieved can be evaluated on the basis 
of the incentive structures the support program sets. Fundamental 
considerations on the design of economic policy in the long run are secondary in 
this regard. Accordingly, transitional state guarantees for banks are justifiable, 
even if these represent soft budget constraints with adverse effects for 
managerial decisions like less diligence (Kornai 1986: 3-30). However, to put it 
metaphorically: one does not rescue someone who is drowning by giving him 
swimming lessons. Nevertheless, it is advisable to find solutions that do not 
undermine long-term targets. In this context one should also avoid any 
undesirable development that is hard to reverse. With these considerations in 
mind some shortcomings of the Germany rescue scheme can be detected. 
First, the rescue package does not tackle the lack in transparency sufficiently 
yet, as evidenced by the persistent interbank spread shown in Figure 9. There 
are two explanations for this occurrence: either banks face problems with non-
performing assets to unforeseen extent or the degree of banks’ financial 
soundness is simply not appraisable. To obtain information about the real 
situation as soon as possible would be highly useful for the public. One might 
hope that official financial statements for the year 2008 will clear conditions up. 
There is certainly also some additional insight in the course of requests to the 
SoFFin, also currently not published by this institution yet. Means are simple, 
though. Just a special audit is missing that might be better based on the 
accounting principle of prudence. Such a specification valid for all banks is 
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strikingly easy to define by the legislator.  
Second, the German rescue package neglects challenges of concentration in 
the banking industry. Landesbanks are merging on a large scale and an 
acquisition within the big commercial banks was supported by injecting capital 
into the Commerzbank. This development impacts competition intensity, is hard 
to reverse and thus unfavourable in the long-run. Competition is also distorted in 
the short term. This is illustrated by the case of Aareal Bank’s request for 
approval of SoFFin support. The bank is financially healthy, but runs for 
SoFFin’s shelter as did competitors in financial distress before. This decision 
aims at lowering the cost of capital. Consequently, the state becomes a 
surrogate for capital markets, not just in case of financial distress, but widely 
used. Evidently, the costs for SoFFin support are too low, a fancy way to 
paralyse the market mechanism. Here, the legal act suffers from a basic flaw, as 
it mentions ‘fees in line with the market’. However, there currently is no market 
for such financial services and the defined yardstick misses accordingly. The 
resulting scope of discretion is apparently improperly used. Of course, 
increasing costs for capital supply and guarantees by the SoFFin should not be 
contradictory to the liquidity targets of banks. So, it is certainly not sensible to 
augment annual fees and payments. An equity investment or even 
nationalisation, as discussed fiercely, is also not necessary. Adequate future 
profit sharing suffices. 
Third, the principle of liability requires some attention, as it is important not to 
outrange the original concept of the rescue package. The original legal basis of 
the SoFFin is clear in this perspective. Bank guarantees, by far the largest part 
of the rescue package, were to expire by the end of 2012. The legal act also 
envisages an exit of the state in case of re-capitalisations, yet without a 
timetable. This clearly has recourse to the reestablishment of the liability concept 
after a transitory period. To define a clear-cut end and limit of government 
support is of prime importance in order to avoid any adverse incentives to bank 
management that expected future bail-outs will have. Not surprisingly, the 
debate on adjustments of the rescue package began right after release of the 
act. The government withstood calls for a ‘bad bank’, taking over non-performing 
assets from the banks at a large scale. Yet, the original act was supplemented in 
February, 2009 (by the FMStErgG with a first draft released February 18th). 
Guarantees now can have a prolonged life-span of five years, compared to the 
three years of the original act. Whether this adjustment is right or wrong can 
hardly be evaluated with the current lack of information on banks’ real situations. 
However, the peril is that floodgates have been opened for ongoing political 
support and interference in the financial markets. This is also illustrated by the 
now new option to nationalize banks, currently limited until mid of 2009. It is not 
the neglect of property rights that is remarkable, because the option to 
nationalize is only feasible in case of a bankruptcy threat, but the increasing 
direct economic power of the state. Finally, nationalisation can be seen as an act 
to prevent acquisitions of banks in financial distress by foreigners, yet with 
alarming allusions to protectionism. 
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5. Conclusion 
The German financial system underwent substantial change in the last decade. 
Many of its traditional characteristics like the close personal network between 
banks and non-financial corporations, the reliance on bank financing and the 
conservative accounting principles do not exist any more. The overall concept of 
these reforms was a more market-oriented approach. This unilateral adjustment 
assumed advantages of the Anglo-Saxon approach, based both on theoretical 
insight and empirical evidence, for example a higher productivity of the financial 
industry in the United States and the United Kingdom. Yet, due to the current 
financial crisis, this model has lost quite a lot of its appeal. While the superiority 
of the market mechanism is beyond theoretical doubt, some empirical results of 
comparative financial market studies remain to be reassessed. In fact, the key 
issue is to identify the preconditions for a proper functioning of financial markets. 
According to the German Ordnungstheorie (Leipold 1990), an adequate order or 
framework of the market mechanism has to be taken into account.  
Thus, regulation of financial markets is a hot topic again. Rules need to be set 
that induce bank decisions that are based on long-term risk-return profiles of 
business activities. Regulation also needs to tackle the problems of systemic 
crisis and the related issue of banks that are too big to fail. However, regulation 
of financial markets is only viable in case of international harmonisation. 
Accordingly, an international rule system for financial markets is to be 
established (Siebert 2008). This may result in true convergence, as the direction 
of adaption needs to turn, because some regulatory deficits in the United States 
are at the bottom of the problems. One might argue that international policy 
coordination will be doomed due to national special interests. Those special 
interests are certainly a challenge, but the radical changes that are underway 
also draw a ‘veil of ignorance’ (Buchanan 1986) over the special interests of 
lobbies. Hence, the current situation offers an extraordinary opportunity for 
international regulatory consent. 
For the German financial markets there are challenges ahead. Despite the 
scope of recent reforms an end of the process is not in sight. Current turmoil will 
only end after necessary regulations have been incorporated. Of prime 
importance will be to reverse the direct state influence that the rescue package 
involves. Concentration constitutes a particular risk for a market-oriented 
approach towards the banking industry. Sheer size will not help make banks 
function again, no matter if the public or the private banking sector is concerned. 
More creative business models for future financial services should be the 
starting point. 
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